“[22] The cell phone and CAA membership, while needed by Ms. Olney, are simply not medical expenses under the provisions of the Act.”
“[25] … I have no difficulty in finding that what the personal trainer did, in ensuring Ms. Olney maintained strength in dealing with not having two arms, was a form of treatment of a physical disorder, therapy. What Ms. Olney was receiving was a form of rehabilitative therapy. Rehabilitative means in effect restoring to normal life by training. I cannot imagine a more apt description of what Ms. Olney was trying to accomplish with her personal trainer. I also find that given Dr. Esguerra’s recommendation for the personal training that this fits within the letter and spirit of therapy as a medical expense under subparagraph 118.2(2)(l.9) of the Act.
“[26] The stumbling block with respect to subparagraph 118.2(2)(l.9) of the Act is that the therapy must be under the “general supervision” of the doctor. The evidence from Ms. Olney was that the doctor would advise her of the appropriate treatment from the personal trainer which she would relay to Ms. Wein. Taking a compassionate view of the situation this could constitute “general”supervision.”
“[27] Ms. Olney paid a person to do the clothes alterations. Can this be swept into the broad category of attendant care? If house cleaning and lawn mowing qualify as attendant care medical expenses, again I see no reason that a payment to someone to do something Ms. Olney could not do herself, that is integral to her living a normal life should not also be considered attendant care. Simply because the alteration of the clothes might take place outside the home, this does not mean it is not attendant care. If a full-time attendant handled clothes alterations there would not be an adjustment denying some of the attendant’s expense, as it related to clothes alterations. It is an expense, I would suggest, that is well within the range of what an attendant might be expected to do for someone such as Ms. Olney. I acknowledge this might be taking an expansive, compassionate view but this is in accordance with prior direction of this Court.”
“[28] The only moving expense in dispute is the cost of the house scouting to Calgary in search of a suitable home. It is well settled that section 62 of the Act, the provision outlining eligible moving expenses, does not allow for house hunting expenses.”