This case looks at the definition of “personal services business” (which limits corporate tax deductions) in the context of major construction in the oilsands industry.
The decision focused on the part of the “personal services business” definition that considers whether the key man behind the corporation “would reasonably be regarded as an officer or employee of the [3rd-party customer] to whom or to which the services were provided but for the existence of the corporation“.
[31] Clearly, the phrase “but for the existence” requires the Court to disregard the actual relationship of the parties, MEG [the third-party] and CJ [the taxpayer, imputed PSB], and determine what would have been done had a different relationship been set up as between Mr. McCarty and MEG.
[32] As noted by Sharlow J. in Dynamic, the hypothetical question is a manifestation of the wording of paragraphs (b) and (c) of the definition. In considering whether Dynamic carried on a personal services business, the Court said that the principles in Wiebe DoorServices Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – MNR), [1986] 3 FC 553 (FCA) [Wiebe Door] and671122 Ontario Ltd. v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., 2001 SCC 59, [2001] 2 SCR 983 [Sagaz] assists in characterizing whether the individual would reasonably be regarded as an employee of a third party purchaser of the services provided by the individual if his/her corporation’s role, rights and obligations were disregarded.
[33] In Sagaz, the Supreme Court of Canada said that the central question is whether the individual who has been engaged to provide services to another is performing them as a person in business on his or her own account.[12] To decide that question, it is necessary to look at the factors, enunciated in Wiebe Door, of control, tools, whether the worker hires helpers, chance of profit and risk of loss. The relative weight of each of those factors depends on the facts of the case. Before turning to those factors, it is necessary to determine if intention is a factor in the application of the provision pertaining to personal services businesses.
[36] Both parties referred to the decision of 609309 Alberta Ltd. v Canada, 2010 TCC 166, 2010 DTC 1136 [609309 Alberta Ltd.], in which Boyle J., at paragraph 23, states:
23. In the context of a personal services business determination, the intention of the parties is not a helpful or relevant test for at least three reasons. …
[37] First, this (anti-avoidance) provision is designed to deny tax advantages otherwise available. Second, a contract between the corporation purchasing and the corporation providing the services will always be a contract for services because a corporation can never be an employee under a contract of services; thus, intention would have been to enter into a contract for services. Third, the provision requires the Court to disregard the existence of the corporation and reasonably guess what the parties would have done otherwise.[13] In G & J Muirhead Holdings Ltd. v Canada, 2014 TCC 49, 2014 DTC 1067, Boyle J. reiterated that intent is irrelevant relating to the personal services business provision.