"[T]hat decision of Justice Addy [Suburban Realty Trust (Trustee of) v Canada,  FCJ no 82 (FCTD)] of the Federal Court of Canada was in connection with a matter that was all one action. Justice Addy also indicated that
there was no bar to the Minister assessing two different amounts for the same
asset in the same taxation year but that he felt such a custom was unfair, as it
effectively had two arm’s length taxpayers battling between themselves with the
court having to decide “who should pay the piper.” I am not facing the same
 The Appellant’s complaint is that AgraCity and SaskCo do not know the
case to meet and should not be forced to go through productions, discoveries and
trials so that the Crown can figure out its case: in effect go on a fishing
expedition. I do not see it that way. Nothing precludes the Crown from issuing
inconsistent assessments to different taxpayers (see Peterson v R [2005 FCA 263 (under the name Tossell)] manage the process to prevent the more real concern of inconsistent judgments."
The Peterson (Tossell) case said on this point:
" The Minister, apparently being uncertain as to the correct tax treatment of the payments, reassessed Ms. Tossell on the basis that they were all taxable, but disallowed all of the deductions claimed by Mr. Peterson. The Minister must have known from the outset that one set of reassessments was necessarily incorrect. However, it is not uncommon for the Minister to issue mutually inconsistent reassessments in order to protect the fisc in the case of a dispute about the tax consequences of a particular transaction. (See, for example, Continental Bank of Canada v. Canada, 1998 CanLII 795 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 358.) That is done because a taxpayer has the right to challenge the correctness of any reassessment in the Tax Court of Canada, while the Minister has no such right. (The taxpayer or the Minister may appeal from the Tax Court to this Court.)"
In AgraCity, Justice Miller also clarify the conditions where the court will order the parties to disclose all their documents relating to the appeal (rule 82), rather than the normal partial disclosure under rule 81.
 Is there a reasonable basis for concluding full disclosure would assist in the
expeditious resolution of the issues? I believe there is. The issue is not whether
the Minister conducted a full and effective audit. Full disclosure is not to make
up for that deficiency, if indeed there was one. Full disclosure is also not
intended to assist one side more than the other. It is meant to ensure that all
relevant materials are known to both sides in an expeditious manner, allowing for
a timely resolution, and if unresolved prior to trial, ensuring the trial judge is
properly presented with such materials.
 I conclude that the nature of the case involving allegations of sham and the
application of section 247(2)(b) of the Act, the amounts involved, the history of
delay, the fact there has been no indication the order would create any hardship time wise or cost wise and also no indication of any possible harm to the Appellant’s business are sufficient grounds to convince me that an order for full disclosure will indeed result in a more expeditious and just proceeding. I disagree with the Appellant that this is a fishing expedition or abuse of process: it is a process very much contemplated by our Rules in appropriate circumstances. [My emphasis.]
See AgraCity Ltd. v. The Queen 2014-1537(IT)G (C. Miller, unreported)