At issue [was] whether assessing a tax on the amounts in issue as “benefits” pursuant to subsection 146(8) rather than by reason of acquiring an unqualified investment and/or property below fair market value pursuant to subsection 146(9) and (10) amounts to an alternative argument that is prohibited by subsection 152(9). This provision allows the Minister to support an assessment on the basis of an alternative argument subject to certain terms and conditions aimed at ensuring that a taxpayer is not prejudiced by a late argument from an evidentiary viewpoint.
 A further restriction is that an alternative argument cannot be advanced when it would result in a reassessment being made outside the normal reassessment period set out in subsection 152(4) (Walsh v. Canada, 2007 FCA 222 at para. 18). This restriction which is central to the present appeal acknowledges the fact that allowing the Minister to raise an argument based on a legal and factual basis that is different from the one underlying the assessment after the normal reassessment period has expired would in effect do away with the limitation period.
 The question turns on whether the alternative argument is within or outside the legal and factual basis underlying the reassessments. ...
 As to the factual basis, the Tax Court judge found that the facts underlying the
reassessments were that funds used to purchase the debentures having nil or nominal value were diverted to a law firm’s trust account in the course of RRSP stripping transactions (reasons at para. 43). According to the Tax Court judge, whether the funds were diverted to the law firm’s trust account directly as the appellant now contends or by way of purchasing assets which had no value is not materially different (reasons at para. 44). The bottom line is that the appellant
engaged in RRSP stripping transactions and that is the factual basis relied upon by the Minister in issuing the reassessments (reasons at para. 46).
On the waiver issue, the Court said:
 I need not dwell on this issue because I agree with the Tax Court judge’s further opinion that allowing the appellant to escape taxation on the basis of a waiver, crafted so as to include the transaction which he maintained had taken place but exclude the transaction which he later revealed after the limitation period had expired, would give rise to an absurd result (reasons at para. 66).
Gramiak v The Queen, 2015 FCA 40